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1 The Strict Avalanche Criterion
A (Boolean) function on Vn , where Vn denotes the the vector space of n-tuples of
elements from GF (2), is said to satisfy the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) if complementing a single bit in its input results in the output of the function being complemented half the time over all the input vectors. The SAC is one of the most important
requirements for cryptographic functions. The formal denition for the SAC seems
to appear rst in the open literature in 1985 11, 12]:

Denition 1 Let f be a function on Vn . f is said to satisfy the SAC if f (x) f (x )

assumes the values zero and one an equal number of times, or simply, f (x) f (x )
is balanced, for every  2 Vn with W () = 1, where x = (x1 : : :  xn ) and W ()
denotes the number of ones in (or the Hamming weight of) the vector .

The SAC has been further generalized in two dierent directions: high order SAC
and propagation criterion. The rst direction is represented by 4], while the second
by 1, 8, 7]. We shall not pursue further these developments in this paper. Instead
we will focus our attention on how to transform functions which do not satisfy the
SAC into ones that satisfy the criterion.

2 Single Functions
First we introduce the following basic theorem.

Theorem 1 Let f be a function on Vn , and A be a nondegenerate matrix of order

n whose entries are from GF (2). Suppose that f (x) f (x i) is balanced for each
row i of A, where i = 1 : : : n and x = (x1 :: :  xn). Then  (x) = f (xA) satises
the SAC.
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Proof. Let i be a vector in Vn whose entries, except the ith, are all zero. Note
that W (i) = 1 and iA = i , i = 1 : : :n. Then we have (x) (x i) =
f (xA) f ((x i)A) = f (u) f (u i), where u = xA. Since A is nondegenerate,
u runs through Vn while x does. By assumption, f (u) f (u i) runs through the
values zero and one an equal number of times while u runs through Vn . Consequently
(x) (x i) runs through the values zero and one an equal number of times while
x runs through Vn . That is, (x) satises the SAC.
ut

Note that the algebraic degree, the nonlinearity and the balancedness of a function
is unchanged under a linear transformation of coordinates 13]. In the case of S-boxes
(tuples of functions), the prole of its XOR distribution table, which measures the
strength against the dierential cryptanalysis 2], also remains invariant under such a
transformation 10]. Thus Theorem 1 provides us a powerful tool to improve the strict
avalanche characteristics of cryptographic functions. In the following we consider two
applications of the theorem.

Application 1 Our rst application shows that a SAC-fullling function on a higher

dimensional space can be easily obtained from a SAC-fullling function on a lower
dimensional space.
Let g(y1 : ::  ys) be a function on Vs that satises the SAC. Adding t pseudocoordinates x1 :: :  xt into g, we obtain a function f on Vs+t , namely,

f (y1: : :  ys x1 : : :  xt) = g(y1 : : :  ys)
The t newly added coordinates have no inuence on the output of f . Hence f does
not satisfy the SAC.
Let A be a nondegenerate matrix of order s + t. Assume that each row i of A can
be written as i = (ii ), where W () = 1, i 2 Vs and i 2 Vt. Let x = (x1 : : : xt),
y = (y1 : : : ys) and z = (y x). Then we have f (z) f (z i ) = g (y) g(y i).
This shows that f (z) f (z i ) is balanced for i, i = 1 :: :  s + t. By Theorem 1,
(z) = f (zA) satises the SAC.
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An example of the matrices that satisfy the requirements is as follows:
2
I
A = 64 s

Qt

3

s

0s t 7
5
It

(1)

where I denotes the identity matrix, 0 denotes the zero matrix, and Q is dened as
2
6
6
6
6
Q = 66
6
6
4

3

1 0  0 7
7
1 0    0 777
:
7
...
7
7
5
1 0  0

Application 2 For each vector  = (i1: : :  is) 2 Vs , we dene a function D on Vs
in the following way:

D (y) = (y1 i1) : : : (ys is)
where y = (y1 : ::  ys) and i denotes the binary complement of i, namely, i = 1 i.
Using this notation, we dene the \concatenation" of 2s functions on Vt as follows:
f (y x) =

M
2Vs

D (y)g (x) r(y)

(2)

where x = (x1 :: :  xt), each g is a function on Vt, and r is an arbitrary function on
Vs . Of particular interest is the concatenation of linear functions on Vt. In Theorems 4
and 5 of 9], the following result is proved:

Lemma 1 When t >= s and all g ,  2 Vs , are distinct nonzero linear functions on

Vt , the function f constructed by (2) is highly nonlinear and balanced. In addition,
f (z) f (z  ) is balanced for all  = ( ) with  6= 0, where z = (y x),  2 Vs
and  2 Vt .
Let A be a nondegenerate matrix of order s + t. Suppose that the ith row i of
A can be written as i = (i i) with i 6= 0, where i 2 Vs and i 2 Vt. Then by
Theorem 1, (z) = f (zA) satises the SAC. Note that the matrix A dened by (1)
satises the requirements.
4

3 A Set of Functions
In computer security practice, such as the design of S-boxes, we often consider a
set of functions. It is desirable that all component functions in a set simultaneously
satisfy the SAC. >From Theorem 1 we can see that given a set of functions on Vn ,
ff1 : ::  fm g, if A is a nondegenerate matrix of order n such that fi(x) fi(x j )
is balanced for every function fi and every row j in A, then g1(x) = f1(xA), : : :,
gm (x) = fm(xA) all satisfy the SAC. The following theorem gives a sucient condition
for the existence of such a nondegenerate matrix.

Theorem 2 Let f1, :: :, fm be functions on Vn. Denote by B the set of vectors  in

Vn such that fj (x) fj (x  ) is not balanced for some 1 <
=j<
= m, and by #B the
number of vectors in B . If #B < 2n;1 , then there exists a nondegenerate matrix A
of order n with entries from GF (2) such that each j (x) = fj (xA) satises the SAC.

Proof. We show how to construct a nondegenerate matrix A of order n, under the
condition that #B < 2n;1 . Denote by S1:::k the set of vectors consisting of all the
linear combinations of vectors 1: : :  k .
The rst row of A, 1, is selected from Vn excluding those in B and the zero vector,
i.e., from the vector set Vn ; B ; S0. There are 2n ; #B ; 20 dierent choices for 1.
The second row of A, 2, is selected from the vector set Vn ; B ; S1 . This guarantees
that 2 is linearly independent of 1. We have 2n ; #B ; 21 dierent choices for 2.
In general, once the rst k ; 1 linearly independent rows 1, : : :, k;1 of A are
selected, the kth row k , k <
= n, will be selected from the vector set Vn ; B ; S1:::k;1 .
This process ensures that 1, : : :, k are all linearly independent.
The number of choices for the last row n is 2n ; #B ; 2n;1 = 2n;1 ; #B > 0.
Therefore, we can always nd a nondegenerate matrix A such that fi(x) fi(x j )
is balanced for every 1 <
=i<
= m and 1 <
=j<
= n. By Theorem 1, 1(x) = f1(xA), : : :,
m(x) = fm(xA) all satisfy the SAC.
ut

Theorem 2 has been applied in 10] to design S-boxes that possess many desirable
cryptographic properties, which include the high nonlinearity, the SAC, the balanced5

ness and the robustness against dierential cryptanalysis. As is shown below, the
transformation technique can also be applied to other approaches to the construction
of S-boxes.

Application 3 With the S-boxes studied in 6, 5, 3] each component function fj

has the following property: fj (x) fj (x ) is balanced for all but one nonzero
vector  2 Vn , where x = (x1 : ::  xn) and n >
= 3 is odd. Thus we have #B <
= n.
By Theorem 2 we can use a nondegenerate matrix to transform all the component
functions of such an S-box into SAC-fullling ones.

4 A Final Remark
In 13], we have constructed highly nonlinear balanced functions on V2k+1 that satisfy
the propagation criterion of degree 2k 8], and highly nonlinear balanced functions
on V2k that satisfy the propagation criterion of degree 43 k. A transformation technique similar to that presented in this paper has played an important role in the
constructions.
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